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ABSTRACT  
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TERRORISM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: AN  
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS FROM THE HORN OF AFRICA  
By  
MBITHI, Antony Mwangangi  
 This study provides an empirical investigation of the political and economic determinants of 
terrorism at a regional level. In contrast to previous studies that investigate the subject on a 
national or global scale, the study carves out the Horn of Africa as a regional security complex 
worthy of investigation. The study employs Global Terrorism Index that captures both domestic 
and transnational terrorism; and also macroeconomic and institutional control variables from the 
seven countries that comprise the Horn of Africa for the period 2002-2013. South Sudan is 
excluded, for it does not fit the time scale under study.  Panel Unobserved Effects Model is run 
to report robust results and policy implications. Despite the normal rhetoric, the results do not 
provide evidence that poor conditions of the region are positively correlated with increase in 
terrorism. However, state political repression is shown to explain the high levels of terrorism in 
the region. State repression suggest that the populace political grievances and need for political 
freedom encourage and motivate terrorists in the region. They see their acts as being justifiable 
when they target political institutions that restrict them to air their grievances peacefully or 
torture and discriminate them along tribal and religious lines. Hence, state repression produces 
unintended consequences by hardening the society, and may inadvertently lead to more 
radicalization. Therefore, this study disputes the poverty thesis and supports Samuel 
Huntington’s argument that countries are not politically unstable because they are poor, and that 
economic development and political stability are two independent goals and therefore it does not 
mean that progress in one leads to progress toward the other, and vice versa.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
BACKGROUND ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TERRORISM IN THE HORN 
OF AFRICA  
1.0 Introduction   
 The use of terror as a means to achieve political and economic ends is not a new 
phenomenon, but has gradually transformed. It has acquired different forms, tactics, and methods, 
but so have counterterrorism responses. Sandler and Enders (1999) argue that terrorism entails 
the pre-meditated or threatened use of extra-normal violence in order to obtain a political, 
ideological, or religious objective through intimidation.  In some cases, political violence has 
been as a result of efforts to change regimes to ones that are less authoritarian and ones that share 
resources equitably.  
            Arguably, terrorist activities attack the core values on which the United Nations Charter 
and its accompanying human rights instruments are founded. Therefore, countering this scourge 
is in the interest of all nations and has been on the agenda of the United Nations, especially after 
the dreadful terror attacks on the United States of America that left approximately three thousand 
people dead, with billions of dollars in property and infrastructure damaged.  
          Terrorist threats in Africa today are orchestrated by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al  
Shabaab in the Horn of Africa, the Lord’s Resistance Army in East Africa, and Wal Jihad and 
Boko Haram in West Africa. The increased level of activities, growing links between these 
groups and their participation in other forms of crimes have greatly affected the social, political 
and economic conditions of the affected countries.  
 
The Political Economy of Terrorism In sub-Saharan Africa: An Empirical Analysis from the 
Horn of Africa? 
 
  
2   
  
                       The Horn of Africa comprises members of the Inter-governmental Authority on  
Development (IGAD), which include: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and 
Uganda. According to Shinn (2006) this region is the most conflict-ridden in the world with 
widespread human rights violations, high number of refugees, and internally displaced people. 
Economically, the region is one of the poorest with high adult and child mortality rate. Life 
expectancy, per capita income, and literacy levels are among the lowest in the world with 
persistent food insecurity due to deadly droughts. The Human Development Index rank of the 
countries is: Djibouti at 170; Eritrea at 182; Ethiopia at 173; Kenya at 147; Somalia at 165;  
Sudan at 166; and Uganda at 164 (UNDP 2015)  
 The Horn of Africa has been described as an epicenter of terrorism. In response to this 
alarming state, the US established the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CTJF-HOA) 
to counter this menace. This has led commentators like Colin Thomas-Jensen and John 
Prendergastat (2007) of the Foreign Affairs to conclude that:   
stemming the spread of terrorism and extremist ideologies has become such an 
overwhelming strategic objective for Washington that it has overshadowed U.S. 
efforts to resolve conflicts and promote good governance; in everything but 
rhetoric, counterterrorism now consumes U.S. policy in the Greater Horn as 
totally as anticommunism did a generation ago.  
 With terrorist activities affecting citizens of the Horn of Africa, a successful counter 
terrorism strategy needs to first understand the main determinants of terrorism in this region 
that breeds and acts as a safe haven for terrorist. 
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1.1 Objectives of the Study   
The broad objective of this study is to investigate the political and economic causative factors 
of terrorism in the Horn of Africa. The specific objectives are:   
1. Establish if state repression causes terrorism in the Horn of  Africa   
2. Examine if poverty causes terrorism in the Horn of Africa  
3. Investigate if there is a causality between increase in population density and terrorism in 
the Horn of Africa  
1.2 Hypothesis   
Following the above objectives, the study will empirically test the following assumptions:  
Hypothesis A   
H0: Poverty does not cause terrorism in the Horn of Africa   
H1: Poverty causes terrorism in the Horn of Africa  
Hypothesis B  
H0: State political repression does not cause terrorism in the Horn of Africa  
H1: State political repression causes terrorism in the Horn of Africa  
Hypothesis C   
H0: Increased population density is not related to an increase in terrorism in the Horn of Africa  
 H1: Increased population density is related to an increase in terrorism in the Horn of Africa    
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1.3 Statement of the Research Problem   
  States in the Horn of Africa are grappling with both internal and intra-state conflicts, 
poverty, and serving as breeding grounds and safe havens for Islamist terrorist organizations. 
Therefore, the region has fully earned the right of being labeled a regional security complex 
(Mesfin 2011). This is because each state’s security is so closely linked together that no state is 
immune from its neighbor’s problems.   
             While a lot of studies have been done on the impact of terrorism on Africa’s economic 
growth, there is a lack of literature that highlights the political and economic causative factors of 
terrorism from one of its epicenter areas – the Horn of Africa – and Africa’s bridge to the Middle 
East. It is in response to this problem that this study seeks to employ economic empiric 
methodology integrated with political and social analysis to bring out the critical causative 
factors of terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa with a focus on the Horn of Africa. Therefore this 
study seeks to use the Horn of Africa to answer the following research questions: Does poverty 
cause terrorism? Does state repression cause terrorism? Is an increased population density related 
to an increase in terrorism? And lastly, does economic development lead to political stability?  
1.4 Justification  
   This study is justifiable on three fronts: Firstly, it uses the idea of regional security 
complex to discuss terrorism from one of its epicenter regions. Secondly, it is the first attempt  
(Known to the author) to bring out an objective analysis of the Horn of Africa’s economic and 
political causative factors of terrorism through employing empiric methodology. And lastly, the 
preceding results will be helpful in designing a successful counter terrorism strategy for the 
region.     
The Political Economy of Terrorism In sub-Saharan Africa: An Empirical Analysis from the 
Horn of Africa? 
 
  
5   
  
1.5 Theoretical Framework  
 This study will adopt Barry Buzan’s regional security complex theory as postulated in 
his work, People, States and Fear (1991).    
1.5.1 Regional Security Complex   
              Buzan contends that a region is a “distinct and significant subsystem of security 
relations existing among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into a 
geographical proximity with each other” (Buzan 1991, 188). Buzan uses the example of South 
Asia as a regional security system that can be seen through the lenses of military standoff 
between India and Pakistan through the balance of power and enmity of suspicions and fear 
(Buzan 1991: 190).  
              Due to this interlink-ages and interdependence, Buzan saw a security complex as, “a 
group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that, their 
national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another” (Buzan 1991: 190). 
Therefore, regional security complexes can be used to explain the spillovers of internal conflicts 
and in relation to this study, how and why transnational terrorist threats and organizations spread 
in a region. For using a regional analysis, one can be able to obtain a holistic view.   
1.5.2 The Horn of Africa as a Regional Security Complex   
            The states of the Horn of Africa share common religious and cultural practices with 
strong economic ties. According to Mesfin (2011), each state’s political destiny is intertwined 
with its neighbors and no state is immune from the other states problems. This can be 
demonstrated by the intra-state conflicts and how different states get involved in each other’s 
conflicts through the support of rebel movements and at times terrorist organizations in the 
region.    
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After the collapse of Said Barre’s regime in 1990, Somalia has been a failed state for 
more than two decades. It acts as safe haven for terrorists for there is no rule of law or a well-
functioning central government. Menkhaus (2005) contends that, it is in the orbit of Wahhabist 
radical Islamic teaching, and its long unpatrolled coastline and unmonitored airstrips makes it a 
perfect safe haven for foreign Jihadists. He further argues that Al Itihad Al Islamiya (AIAI) 
which is a radical Islamic organization provide a good partner for Al-Qaida. In recent years, 
AIAI has been able to partner with Al-Qaida and Al-Shabaab.    
 Djibouti has been used as a transit point for terrorists coming from the Middle East. 
This is one of the reasons why the US has established Camp Lemonnier – a naval 
expeditionary base – and it is also the home to the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, 
the only permanent US military base in Africa. According to Schermerhorn (2005), since 9/11 
the US has greatly used Djibouti’s geographical advantage in its counter terrorism activities.  
With a diverse society of half Muslim, and half Christian, Eritrea is vulnerable to 
different political ideologies. The Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM) originated from 
Sudan in 1988 with help from Al-Qaida.  According to Gunaratna (2005), by mid-1990s, EIJM 
had more than five hundred trained fighters and had become part of Majlis A-Fatwa – Al- 
Qaida’s international network’s coordinating council. In recent years, Eritrea has been 
blacklisted as a state that sponsors terrorism by the US and was expelled from IGAD 
membership until recently.   
Sharing a long border with Somalia – a failed state – Ethiopia has experienced terror 
attacks from Somalia’s Al Itihad Al Islamiya (AIAI).  However, Ethiopia has been able to thwart 
these attacks and has been a successful case in counter terrorism activities in the region (Shinn, 
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2005). Its troops have taken part in many African Union peace keeping missions in Somalia and 
is currently part of the UN sponsored African Mission in Somalia (AMISON).   
   Uganda has suffered from domestic terrorism that comes from the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA) and the Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF). Their activities have led to more 
than 5,000 deaths. However, transnational terrorism has also affected Uganda. For example, in 
July 2010 seventy four football spectators were killed in Kampala bombing.  In addition to the 
bombing of a bus headed to Nairobi in December 2010. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for 
both attacks. Uganda has since had its troops in Somalia under the AMISON umbrella 
(Kimunguyi, 2011).   
 Kenya has had a fair share of terror attacks. The 1976 attack on a hotel owned by Israel 
in Nairobi; 7th of August 1998, the bombing of US embassy in Nairobi which killed 213 and 
wounded 5,000 with Al-Qaeda claiming responsibility; 28th  November 2002, Car bomb 
detonated at an Israeli-owned hotel killing 12 Kenyans, 3 Israelis and 3 Suicide bombers near 
the port of Mombasa with Al-Qaeda claiming responsibility; 21st September 2013, Westgate 
Mall attack killed 67 people with 170 wounded - Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility; and 
recently on 2nd April 2015, Al-Shabaab attacked Garissa University in North Eastern Kenya 
killing 150 students (Aljazeera, 2015). Despite these attacks, it remains a key US ally in the war 
against anti-western extremism in the region. Since 2011, the Kenyan troops intervened in 
Somalia and are currently part of AMISON forces.   
   Sudan became the first African nation on US list that sponsors terrorism. Al-Qaida 
and Bin Laden found a safe haven in Sudan in the early period of 1990s. In July 2006, Al-
Qaida claimed that it had established Al-Qaida in Sudan and Africa, and claimed responsibility 
for beheading Al-Wifaq, the chief editor of Sudanese Independent daily.  Sudan has also been 
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accused of maintaining links with Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. This is one of the 
reasons why Israel has often militarily targeted Sudanese weapons from Iran destined for Gaza 
(Timothy, 2005).   
   According to Shinn (2005), the Horn of Africa is ‘interlinked to an even greater 
extent than in the case of other regions in Africa, thereby creating a security complex that if 
looked into, will shape the next generations’ future perspective of the region.   
   Based on Huntington’s (1968) argument that countries are not politically unstable 
because they are poor, and that economic development and political stability are two independent 
goals and therefore it does not mean that progress in one leads to progress toward the other, and 
vice versa. This study empirically assesses the political and economic determinants of terrorism 
in the Horn of Africa region to ascertain the best counter terrorism strategy that needs to be 
employed as most international donors have focused on the poverty thesis as the key determinant. 
This has meant that most of the counter terrorism resources have been injected in reducing 
poverty in a bid to counter terrorism, with less emphasis on the political spectrum. If the results 
are not statistically significant that poverty is not positively correlated with increase in terrorism, 
then the research will disapprove the poverty thesis, and call for a more balanced counter 
terrorism strategy.   
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Chapter two will review literature that 
addresses terrorism from a political economic perspective. This will entail examining the 
political and economic determinants of terrorism. Chapter three will introduce the study’s data 
characteristics, and econometric specifications. The fourth chapter will present the study’s 
empirical findings and limitations, while the last chapter will wrap up the study and give policy 
implications and recommendations.  
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CHAPTER TWO  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
This chapter will review literature that addresses terrorism from a political economic 
perspective. This will entail examining the political and economic determinants of terrorism.   
2.0 Economic Determinants of Terrorism   
 After 9/11 most of the literature concurred that poverty was a major cause of terrorism 
(Kahn and Weiner 2002, 3). This was in agreement with previous studies on the economics of 
conflicts. For example, Alesina et al (1996) contend that there is a correlation between political 
instability and GDP growth, as the probability of coups happening is always associated with 
with poor economic conditions.  However, Krueger and Laitin (2003) empirical findings using 
data from the U.S State Department on transnational terrorist attacks found no causal 
relationship between poverty and terrorism.   
 Alberto Abadie (2005) refutes such results and argues that Krueger and Laitin (2003) 
findings have some shortcomings. Their use of the U.S. State Department data, he argues, is 
limiting for such data only covers events of international terrorism which only represents a 
small percentage of terrorist activities. Abadie (2005) gives the example of the 2003 Memorial 
Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism Knowledge Base Report that recorded 1,536 events of 
domestic terrorism compared to 240 events of international terrorism.   
    Oino and Sorre (2003) through their qualitative study cite high poverty levels and 
socio-economic deprivation of some of the parts of the Kenyan society and the Horn of Africa as 
the reason behind the rise in terror attacks in the country and the region in large. This was 
supported by another qualitative study by David Shinn (2005) who contends that the U.S.  
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counter terrorism policy in Ethiopia would be successful if it addresses poverty and supports the 
government in equitably sharing resources.  
On the contrary, Abadie’s (2005) empiric study focuses on transnational terrorism and 
uses a measure that includes both domestic and transnational terrorism through the use of the  
World Market Research Center’s Global Terrorism Index (WMRGTI). He also uses landlocked 
status of a country as an instrumental variable to address any endogeniety that may arise between 
the economic state of a country and its level of terrorism risk. His results validate Piazza (2004) 
and Krueger and Laitin (2003) findings that in poor countries, terrorism risk is not significantly 
higher especially when specific country characteristics such as political freedom are taken into 
account.  Krueger and Maleckova (2004) study Hezbollah and Hamas and posit that terrorist 
groups are not poor or poorly educated. Therefore, they proceed to conclude that economic 
conditions and educational level are poor determinants of terrorism.   
Mesquita (2005) refutes the above findings and posits that one cannot come to a 
conclusion that poverty does not determine terrorist mobilization just by the mere fact that such 
recruits are better educated. Recruits can be well educated and still be poor, especially in 
developing countries where employment opportunities are few.  This is because economic 
downturns increase mobilization through decreasing opportunity costs. Therefore economic 
factors determine the level of terrorism risk.   
Tavares (2004) posits that richer countries have a more probability of experiencing terror 
attacks; however democratic countries are less likely to experience such attacks.  Kis-Katos,  
Liebert, and Schulze (2005) argue that terrorism decreases with an increase in income levels.  
They find that an increase in GDP per capita does increase terrorism, thereby implying that 
poverty does cause terrorism.  
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Burgon (2006) empirical findings show a positive correlation between terrorism and 
population density. These findings are supported by Bandyopadhyay and Younas (2001) who use 
population density in their study to access if densely populated countries are more vulnerable to 
terrorism. Their results indicate that a more densely populated country brings a limitation in the 
fight against terrorism.  
2.1 Political Determinants of Terrorism    
            Bruce Hoffman (2001: 40) defines terrorism as “the deliberate creation and exploitation 
of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change” Rosendorff 
and Sandler (2005) posit that domestic terrorism is homegrown and home-directed, unlike 
transnational terrorism. Drakos and Gofas (2006) see the cause of domestic terrorism as being 
grievances that arise from political, social, and economic conditions which encourage and 
motivate terrorists. Therefore, as Crenshaw (1981) observed, terrorists end up using violence in 
order to achieve their political goals due to the absence of feasible alternatives. Aksoy and Carter 
(2011) argue that terrorists see their acts as being justifiable because the targeted political 
institutions restricted them to air their grievances peacefully.   
                Savun and Philips (2009) argue that politically open and democratic regimes ensure 
that the citizens freely participate in civil and political activities of a country. In return they are 
able to use nonviolent means of political participation to air their grievances and pursue their 
interests. However, Polo (2012) observes that even though fully democratic regimes may less 
likely be affected by terrorism, highly authoritarian regimes may make dissident political 
violent action impossible to conduct through crack downs. The study concludes that regimes 
undergoing political transitions and those countries with intermediate levels of political rights 
and civil liberties are more prone to domestic terrorism.  
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               Though electoral institutions are meant to bring about inclusive representations, Polo 
(2012) sees the degree of inclusiveness of a political system through elections as not being 
enough in accessing the presence of discriminatory policies that deny certain groups access to 
power. Therefore, domestic political institutions, however democratic they may be, may be seen 
by a part of the population as not having inclusive representation. This leads to calls for self-
determination. In non-homogenous political environment, one not only needs to look at national 
level characteristics but more on specific groups of the population.  
              Indridason (2008) posits that terrorism has far much more political effect than just 
placing national security on the political agenda. He sees it as an influence to government 
formation. This is because terrorism calls for rallying around the flag, thereby overcoming 
internal disagreements and forming inclusive coalitions. On the other hand, he sees terrorism as 
an influence on the government’s survival as the voters seek for a government that can provide 
security for them.   
            Huntington (1968) sees economic growth and modernization as forces that eventually 
cause social and political decay, finally leading to coups, political violence and failed states. He 
sees economic growth as a condition that forces itself to the society without waiting for any 
stable political institutions to be in place. Therefore according to Huntington, the stability of a 
society is not dependent upon modernization or economic growth, for both are independent 
entities and a progress in one does not guarantee progress toward the other. He sees a political 
gap between governments of US, USSR, and Great Britain as compared to those of Latin 
America, Africa and Asia where those of the first cohort, the people shared a common vision 
and have a consensus on the legitimacy of those in powers. On the second cohort, the political 
community is disintegrated and the institutions have little power. He also points out the 
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existence of economic gap, however, he posits that the political and economic gaps are not 
identical for there are underdeveloped economies that have highly developed political systems 
and vice versa.   
   While overseas development assistance is more focused on economic development as 
they presume that economic development leads to political stability, Huntington’s argument is 
that they two are not connected. He sees the preoccupation of promoting democracy through free 
elections by Western powers in modernizing countries as one of the reasons that exacerbates and 
destroys the structure of public authority in these countries. For Huntington, “the primary 
problem is not liberty but the creation of a legitimate public order. Men may of course have order 
without liberty but they cannot have liberty without order” (Huntington, 1968: 7-8)  
   Lastly, Huntington (1968) observes that modernization which entails industrialization, 
urbanization, and increase in Gross National Product, among others, does not mean political 
modernization as shown by the Latin American experience lead toward democracy. This is 
because traditional authority is undermined with local chieftaincy being replaced by elite 
bureaucrats. This leads to resource competition, inequality in resource distribution and economic 
development and finally leading to conflicts.  Therefore his argument rejects the poverty thesis 
that countries are politically unstable because they are poor. This he sums up by contending that, 
“it is not the absence of modernity but the efforts to achieve it which produce political disorder. 
If poor countries appear to be unstable it is not because they are poor, but because they are trying 
to be rich. A purely traditional society would be ignorant, poor and stable” (Huntington, 1968: 41)   
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2.2 Literature Gap  
With most research on the interplay between the economy and terrorism being in the area 
of economic consequences of terrorist attacks, the available literature on the economic 
determinants of terrorism shows a lot of contending debates with no clear answer especially on a 
country or regional level. This means that every country or region may have its own determinants. 
However, despite the talk that poverty is to blame for the increase in terrorism in the Horn of 
Africa; the outlined literature shows a sharp contrast on this issue especially on the poverty thesis 
that countries are politically unstable because they are poor. Therefore this study will employ 
empirical methodology to discover the political and economic determinants of terrorism in one of 
its epicenter regions of Africa, in a bid to fill the literature gap.   
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
The Political Economy of Terrorism In sub-Saharan Africa: An Empirical Analysis from the 
Horn of Africa? 
 
  
15   
  
CHAPTER THREE  
METHODOLOGY  
DATA AND MODEL SPECIFICATIONS  
3.0 Introduction  
Given the emergence a regional security complex (RSC) in the Horn of Africa – which 
has been labeled as a safe haven and breeding ground of terrorism in Africa – the study will 
analyze the seven countries that comprise the RSC. Therefore, the empirical work seeks to test 
three main hypotheses: poverty causes terrorism in the Horn of Africa; state repression causes 
terrorism; and lastly, rapid population growth is not related to an increase in terrorism.   
3.1 Model Specification  
In this function, a measure of terrorism risk is taken as the dependent variable with GDP 
per capita, Political Terror Scale, population, polity2, Rule of Law, Political Stability, and Voice 
and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, and Youth Labor Force Participation, being 
expressed as the independent/explanatory variable. The main objective of this specification is to 
find out if poverty or the society’s welfare (GDP per capita), state repression (Political Terror 
Scale), and increase in population have a positive or negative impact on terrorism in the Horn of 
Africa.    
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The specification is as follows:  
Terr_risk = Terr_risk (Gdp_pc, Pol_ts, Popln, polity2, Pol_Stab, R_Law, gvt_effc, Voice_Acc, 
lfp_youth)   
Where:  
Terr_risk = Terrorism risk  
Gdp_pc = Gross Domestic Product per capita   
Pol_ts = Political Terror Scale   
Popln = Population   
polity2 = Political Freedom  
          lfp_youth = Youth Labor Force Participation   
R_Law = Rule of Law    
Pol_Stab = Political Stability   
Voice_Acc = Voice and Accountability   
3.2   Variable Explanation and Data Source   
        The choice of the control variables was based on existing literature wherein most of them 
were robust determinants of terrorism.   
3.2.1 Terrorism Risk  
         Terrorism risk (Terr_Risk) covers the amount of terrorist risk a country faces at a particular 
year. The Institute for Economics and Peace Global Terrorism Index (WMRC-GTI 2014) for the 
period 2002-2013 will be used. It looks at terrorism through the lens of motivation, scale, 
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presence, prevention, and efficacy. Its range is 0-10 with higher values denoting higher levels of 
terrorism exposure.   
3.2.2 Poverty  
        Poverty will be measured using GDP per capita (Gdp_pc) which measures the average 
income of every person in a country. This will come from the World Bank (2015).  This is in line 
with the fact that consumption is a good proxy of the people’s welfare and wellbeing. It is 
expected that the coefficient sign will be negative.   
3.2.3 State Repression  
         State Repression (Gibney et al, 2015) will be measured using Political Terror Scale 
(Pol_ts). It measures state repression on a scale of 1-5 with high levels of state repression where 
incidences of torture, state-sanctioned killings, disappearances, police brutality, political 
murders, and imprisonment are very common. The coefficient sign is expected to be positive.   
3.2.4 Population  
         Population measures (Popln) from the World Bank (2015) will entail the total population of 
every country in a bid to access the effect of a growing population in relation to terrorism risk. A 
growing population in unstable countries makes it difficult to provide for its security, manage 
and satisfy its needs. The coefficient sign is expected to be positive, since increase in population 
density makes it difficult for a government to provide security especially in developing countries 
which have few resources.   
3.2.5 Democratic Score  
         Political freedom comes from Marshall and Jaggers (2015) Polity2 Index (Polity2). The 
index ranges from 1-7 with high values signifying the presence of democratic institutions.  The 
response of governments to the demands of their citizenry is a determinant of terrorism.  
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Democracies provide peaceful ways for conflict resolution. However, it depends on the countries 
under study, as Abadie (2005) found out that terrorism and political freedom have a non-
monotonic relationship, meaning that countries transitioning from autocracy to democracy tend 
to experience more terrorism.   
3.2.6 Youth Labour Force Participation  
         Youth labor force participation (Y_lfp) data will come from the World Bank (2015) and it 
measures the number of youth people between the ages of 15-24 that are economically active. An 
increase in youth labor force participation is associated with a reduction in terrorism as the youth 
engage in more meaningful activities, and thus are less expected to be involved in political 
violence and groups.    
3.2.7 Rule of Law   
         Rule of Law (R_Law) from the World Bank Governance Indicator (2015) will be used as a 
control variable as most states in the region fail in the observance of the rule of law. This 
indicator measures how much confidence the public have on the rules of the society and how 
they obey them through institutions such as the police and the courts. Increase in rule of law is 
expected to reduce terrorism, meaning that a negative sign in the coefficient is expected  
3.2.8 Political Stability  
        With most of the states in the Horn of Africa facing or being faced with political 
instability through internal conflicts, Political Stability (Pol_Stab) from the World Bank 
Governance Indicator (2015) will be employed. This indicator looks at the perceptions of the 
likelihood that violence may be used to topple the government through unconstitutional means. 
An increase in political stability is expected to reduce terrorism. Therefore a negative sign in 
the coefficient is expected.  
The Political Economy of Terrorism In sub-Saharan Africa: An Empirical Analysis from the 
Horn of Africa? 
 
  
19   
  
3.2.9 Voice and Accountability  
         Voice and accountability (Voice_Acc) from the World Bank Governance Indicators (2015) 
will be used as a control. This indicator looks at the citizen’s freedom of expression, free media, 
freedom of association, and right to choose their own governments. A negative sign in the 
coefficient is expected as voice and accountability is associated with a reduction in terrorism.  
3.2.10 Government Effectiveness  
         Government effectiveness (govt_effc) from the World Bank Governance Indicators (2015) 
will be used as an institutional control variable. This indicator looks at how independent the 
civil service is from political pressures as well as the quality of the public services that it offers. 
The coefficient sign is expected to be negative for effectiveness in the government should 
generally reduce terrorism.  
3.3 Econometric Specifications   
                      In determining the political and economic determinants of terrorism in the Horn of  
Africa, N=1…7, countries are observed for T = 1…11, time. Therefore, panel data estimation 
technique is the best approach to undertake the study. Panel data analysis has the ability of 
bringing out the complexity that is present in human behavior than time series data (Cheng 
2006). By pooling data together, one is able to more accurately predict individual outcomes, and 
learn an individual behavior through observing the behavior of others (Cheng et al, 2006).  
Using country level data of seven countries that comprise the Horn of Africa for the 
period 2002-2013, I estimate the following terrorism model:   
???????????? ? ?? ? ???????????????? ??????????????? ? ?????????????? ? ???????????
? ???????? ? ??????????? ? ??????????? ? ???????????? ???????????? ? ???? 
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In the above model, I test the extent to which poverty, state repression, and population 
density determines terrorism. Therefore, the three variables are the core explanatory variables of 
the political and economic determinants of terrorism in the Horn of Africa.  Polity2, rule of law, 
government effectiveness, political stability, youth labor force participation, and voice and 
accountability will be used as control variables. The control variables are chosen based on 
existing theoretical and empirical studies on political and economic determinants of terrorism.   
In order to specify the method of analysis to employ – Fixed effects or Random Effects – 
Hausman test was conducted to determine if explanatory variables were uncorrelated with 
unobserved country heterogeneities. Hausman test is the most preferred and efficient  
(Wooldridge 2006). The study’s test rejects the null hypothesis at 1%; therefore, I use fixed 
effects in my estimations.  Fixed effects helps in controlling for all time-invariant differences, 
thereby making the estimated coefficients to be unbiased due to omission of time-invariant 
characteristics like gender, culture, and religion, among others (Cheng et al, 2006).   
Lastly, in order to investigate if the society’s wellbeing or poverty in the current year is 
affected by the wellbeing or poverty in the previous years, in a different specification I use a 
lagged GDP per capita t-1 in order to remove any potential endogeniety problems.   
???????????? ? ?? ? ?????????????????????????? ? ???  
  
The preceding chapter will present the study’s empirical results and analysis.    
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CHAPTER FOUR  
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS  
4.0 Empirical Results   
   Political and Economic Determinants of Terrorism  
Dependent Variable: Terrorism Risk  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 fe1 fe2 fe3 fe4 fe5 fe6 
VARIABLES Terr_Risk Terr_Risk Terr_Risk Terr_Risk Terr_Risk Terr_Risk 
       
lngdp_pc -0.447 -0.748 -0.595 -0.922 -0.610 -0.339 
 (0.365) (0.574) (0.656) (0.790) (0.493) (0.577) 
pol_ts 0.945** 0.926** 0.737** 1.002** 0.709* 0.927** 
 (0.368) (0.350) (0.266) (0.339) (0.292) (0.292) 
lnpopln 5.266 6.034* 5.762* 7.007** 6.825*** 7.966* 
 (3.653) (2.779) (2.644) (2.170) (1.821) (3.871) 
polity2  -0.247 -0.157 -0.110 -0.0386 0.0689 
  (0.270) (0.292) (0.255) (0.207) (0.127) 
Pol_Stab   -1.110 -1.007 -0.652 -0.927 
   (0.920) (0.994) (0.770) (1.098) 
govt_effc    1.854* 3.502*** 4.098*** 
    (0.924) (0.535) (0.774) 
R_Law     -3.047** -2.288** 
     (1.030) (0.729) 
lfp_youth      0.255 
      (0.331) 
Voice_Acc      -2.153 
      (1.456) 
Constant -83.72 -94.62* -91.86* -109.3** -108.1** -149.0 
 (60.94) (47.67) (45.23) (37.80) (31.02) (78.19) 
       
Observations 84 84 84 84 84 72 
R-squared 0.292 0.343 0.392 0.429 0.523 0.654 
Number of country code 7 7 7 7 7 6 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
Note: Djibouti is excluded from specification (6) due to lack of data on youth labor force participation     
  
Terr_risk = terrorism risk; Pol_ts = Political terror scale; Lngdp_pc = Log of GDP per capita; 
lnPopln = Log of Population; Polity2 = democratic score; gvt_effc=government effectiveness; 
Pol_stab= Political stability and lack of violence/terrorism; Voice_acc = Voice and accountability; 
lfp_youth = Youth Labor force participation; R_Law = Rule of law  
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    One year Lag  
Political and Economic Determinants of Terrorism  
Dependent Variable: Terrorism Risk  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 fe1 fe2 fe3 fe4 fe5 fe6 
VARIABLES Terr_Risk Terr_Risk Terr_Risk Terr_Risk Terr_Risk Terr_Risk 
       
lnLaggdppc -0.556 -0.764 -0.696 -0.739 -0.265 -0.0584 
 (0.409) (0.642) (0.685) (0.756) (0.570) (0.263) 
pol_ts 1.075** 1.065** 0.866** 1.152** 0.884** 1.126*** 
 (0.419) (0.404) (0.342) (0.391) (0.286) (0.195) 
lnpopln 6.206 6.890* 6.836* 7.880** 7.606** 8.575** 
 (3.770) (3.037) (2.968) (2.554) (2.068) (3.207) 
polity2  -0.195 -0.117 -0.0753 0.00403 0.0766 
  (0.255) (0.267) (0.241) (0.198) (0.0923) 
Pol_Stab   -1.101 -0.881 -0.605 -0.853 
   (0.785) (0.815) (0.676) (0.818) 
govt_effc    2.073* 3.659*** 3.872*** 
    (0.891) (0.690) (0.886) 
R_Law     -3.241** -2.282** 
     (1.011) (0.849) 
lfp_youth      0.392 
      (0.257) 
Voice_Acc      -3.147* 
      (1.450) 
Constant -99.09 -109.2* -109.5* -125.0** -123.7** -170.9** 
 (63.34) (52.01) (50.60) (44.00) (35.20) (64.05) 
       
Observations 77 77 77 77 77 66 
R-squared 0.322 0.354 0.403 0.445 0.550 0.712 
Number of country code 7 7 7 7 7 6 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Terr_risk = terrorism risk; Pol_ts = Political terror scale; Lngdp_pc = Log of GDP per capita; 
lnPopln = Log of Population; Polity2 = democratic score; gvt_effc=government effectiveness; 
Pol_stab= Political stability and lack of violence/terrorism; Voice_acc = Voice and accountability; 
lfp_youth = Youth Labor force participation; R_Law = Rule of law  
Note: Djibouti is excluded from specification (6) due to lack of data on youth labor force 
participation  
 Source: Authors calculations using Stata   
 
The Political Economy of Terrorism In sub-Saharan Africa: An Empirical Analysis from the 
Horn of Africa? 
 
  
23   
  
This chapter presents -fixed effects robust- findings, from panel data estimations of the 
seven Horn of Africa countries from the years 2002 to 2013. The results of the regression 
analysis are presented in the above tables and in table 3 and 4 in the appendix. The summary 
statistics and pairwise correlation are presented in table (1) and (2) respectively in the 
appendix.   
In testing if a country’s wellbeing causes terrorism, a measure of GDP per capita was 
employed. GDP per capita is a good proxy of the consumption possibilities of the populace. The 
theoretical presumption behind GDP per capita connection to terrorism is that in a developing 
country context, increases in a society’s wellbeing is expected to reduce probability for 
individuals to be radicalized, and hence, reduce terrorism. People would be more inclined to 
radicalization in situations of low income than in high income situations. A poor cross-section of 
a population is faced with a tradeoff between pay offs from engaging in terrorism and being idle 
and disenfranchised.   
In Table 3, the results indicate that there is no statically significant causality between 
society’s wellbeing and terrorism. We can see that although the coefficient of GDP per capita 
(society’s wellbeing) is negative, its insignificance is robust to alternative specifications.   
Therefore, we can infer that national income and wellbeing of the countries in the Horn 
of Africa is not significantly associated with terrorism.  This result refutes David Shinn (2005) 
qualitative argument that poverty leads to terrorism, and that a good U.S. counter terrorism 
strategy towards the Horn of Africa should be geared towards addressing poverty. However, the 
findings validate the empirical work by Piazza (2004) and Krueger and Laitin (2003) whose 
findings indicate that in poor countries, terrorism risk is not significantly higher especially when 
specific country characteristics such as political freedom are taken into account.  
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  While previous studies have only looked at authoritarian regimes using the Freedom 
House political rights index to suggest that authoritarian regimes are able to put off political 
dissent, and therefore experience less terrorism, this study employs a unique measure of 
authoritarianism –  state repression – through the use of the Political Terror Scale (Gibney et al, 
2015) that measures levels of state repression where incidences of torture, state-sanctioned 
killings, disappearances, police brutality political murders, and imprisonment are practiced; as it 
is common in states in the  Horn of Africa.  
In a bid to ascertain if state political repression is associated with terrorism, after 
employing a robust check on the regression, it can be inferred that state repression increases 
terrorism. A one standard deviation change in state repression leads to approximately one unit 
increase in terrorism risk. For example the coefficient is 0.945 in specification 1, table 3. This 
result remains significantly different from zero across alternative model specifications with the 
coefficient only marginally changed.   
It is evident that through a regional analysis and especially the Horn of Africa these 
findings discredit Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze (2005) findings that strong autocratic regimes 
do not breed more terrorism and that terrorism increases with an increase in democracy. 
However, it validates Aksoy and Carter (2011) argument that terrorists see their acts as being 
justifiable because the targeted political institutions restricted them to air their grievances 
peacefully. Arguably, the results have theoretical reasoning, because state repression produces 
unintended consequences by hardening the society and may in advertently lead to more 
radicalization. This may be a good reason behind the fact that most youth in the region and 
continent – where most regimes are repressive – are being radicalized as opposed to the normal 
rhetoric of poverty as a cause of radicalization.    
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The Horn of Africa as many parts of Africa, is experiencing high population growth and 
youth bulge. In order to ascertain if population density is significantly associated with terrorism, 
the results from the regression show that an increase in population increases terrorism. The 
coefficient for population is positive and significant at 1%. The result is robust when other 
variables are introduced in the regression specifications (2) – (6). A 1% increase in population 
leads to approximately 5 unit increase in terrorism risk. The results conform to both Burgon 
(2006) and Bandyopadhyay and Younas (2001) findings that densely populated countries are 
vulnerable to terrorism. This makes sense in the context of developing countries which have 
limited income and capability to manage growing populations.   
Government effectiveness was not a main independent variable; however, the results 
show that an increase in government effectiveness leads to an increase in terrorism. In normal 
circumstances this is unexpected, and might seem a mistaken idea. However, this is very evident 
in transitional regimes as explained by Hjeds (2008) who posits that in transitional regimes, the 
market system replaces planned economy systems. Therefore, the problem is not transforming 
the institutions, but getting them adopted and having people acting according to them by trusting 
them. This, according to Hjeds (2008), has been done with different results in transition countries, 
and as a result, has led to economic inequality, corruption, ethnic hatred, gender inequality, crime, 
and terrorism.  
The World Bank government effectiveness indicator measures how the civil service is 
independent from political pressures. From the preceding results we can infer that the civil 
service in the Horn of Africa is in transitional period and has misused the independence they 
have been given. This is evident in most countries where the civil service is in transition. For 
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example, the provision of public services has been skewed along tribal lines thereby generating 
hatred, inequality, and ultimately increasing the risk of terrorism.   
In order to look if the society’s wellbeing in the current is affected by the wellbeing in the 
previous years, the study employed a lagged GDP per capita t-1 in order to remove any potential 
endogeniety problems. From the results in table (4) in the appendix, after applying a one year lag, 
the results robustly remain the same and do not alter the previous findings.   
The rest of the control variables, conform to stylized findings. Looking at the rule of law, 
we can infer that an increase in the rule of law reduces terrorism, as is the case for voice and 
accountability.  This is because the citizenry have a high confidence in the police service, and the 
courts to resolve their grievances.  
4.1 Limitations of the Study   
This study has two limitations. Firstly, GDP per capita is a rough proxy for the wellbeing 
of the society. A better alternative to capture a people’s wellbeing would be proxy measures such 
as Gini coefficient. However, the study could not use this due to measurement error for the 
observations on Gini coefficient are not readily available for the most of the years of interest of 
the sample of countries under study.     
The use of total population as a measure for population density is relatively a good proxy. 
However, with most of the states in the region facing youth bulge, a variable for measuring total 
youth population through the years 15-24 would be a good measure as youth bulges make for low 
opportunity costs for those who can be recruited as terrorists as argued by Urdal (2006).  
However, this measurement could not be used as observations for the years and countries under 
study are unavailable.   
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CHAPTER FIVE  
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
  
5.0 Conclusion  
This study analyzed the political and economic determinants in the Horn of Africa’s 
regional security complex through a panel regression analysis.  The study first mapped out the 
importance of the Horn of Africa as a regional security complex in its own right. The empirical 
analysis employed the Institute for Economics and Peace Global Terrorism Index for the period 
2002-2013 to measure terrorism in the region; GDP per capita to measure poverty; Political  
Terror Scale to measure state repression; total country population to measure population density;  
Polity2 to measure democratic score; and World Bank’s governance indicators that included: 
government effectiveness; rule of law; political stability; and voice and accountability.       
The results indicate that poverty is not significantly associated with terrorism. This goes 
against the widely held belief that poverty is a major root cause of terrorism in the Horn of Africa. 
However, using the state political terror scale, we infer that state political repression does highly 
contribute to terrorism. It is evident that even though some countries in the Horn of Africa do 
hold elections, this does not fully mean that they are completely democratic as political 
assassinations, imprisonment, torture, and disappearances among the members of the opposition 
abound. Therefore, state repression produces unintended consequences by hardening the society 
and may in advertently lead to more radicalization. A transition to more open and democratic 
societies in the region is needful.   
With most countries in Africa experiencing an increase in population which also includes 
a youth bulge, a measure of population density was included in the equation. The results 
indicated that an increase in population does indeed increase terrorism. This can be attributed to 
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an increase in competition of scarce resources especially with most countries hosting high 
number of refugees and governments being unable to control and manage these growing 
populations, especially youth bulges that clamor for more democratic space in these authoritarian 
states.   
The independence of the public service has shown that the institutions are not fully 
transformed to serve the citizenry better but they have contributed to economic inequality, 
corruption, ethnic hatred, and ultimately, terrorism. Therefore, even if the state needs to make the 
civil service independent from political pressures, the intervening transitional period needs to be 
well managed, for it can bring negative results.  
From the above analysis, it is evident that the crucial political and economic determinants 
of terrorism in the Horn of Africa are state political repression, an increase in population density, 
and problems of governance transitions. A realization of these causative factors will be of help to 
policy makers in designing a successful counter terrorism strategy to one of the epicenters and 
breeding grounds of terrorism.   
5.1 Policy Recommendations   
Following the results from the panel regressions, this study recommends the following 
policies to the involved stakeholders of the region.   
5.1.1 Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)  
IGAD’s Political Affairs Program which comes under the Peace and Security Division is 
responsible for using preventive diplomacy through the promotion of democracy, governance, 
and human rights observance to counter conflicts in the region. In light of the fact that state 
political repression highly contributes to the increase in terrorism in the region, this study 
proposes a more active and well-funded Political Affairs Program that would undertake the 
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bringing out of annual reports of human rights observance among the member states in relation 
to the ensuing security threats, and have them addressed in IGAD’s meetings. The United 
Nations Charter on Human Rights and the African People and Human Rights Charter (Banjul 
Charter) should be used as their gold standard in pursuit of this policy.      
5.1.2 United States Counter Terrorism Policy for the Horn of Africa  
The presence of Camp Lemonnier – a naval expeditionary base in Djibouti – and home to 
the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), the only permanent US military 
base in Africa, calls for a look at one of the global hegemons counter terrorism policies towards 
the region. Burgess (2013) of the US Air War College points out the importance of the 
CJTFHOA efforts to win the hearts and minds of the people of the region in a bid to prevent the 
communities from joining and sympathizing with extremist groups. This according to Burgess  
(2013) should be done through an indirect strategy as opposed to the direct strategy employed in  
Afghanistan and Iraq. They have been able to use IGAD member states’ military forces 
(AMISON) to fight the terror groups.   
   Despite this good arrangement, AMISON and other African forces have not been able to 
win the hearts and minds of the communities in the region. They have been accused of violating 
human rights of the communities by being involved in widespread sexual violence in Somalia 
through raping of local women and girls (Amnesty International 2013), with victims being as 
young as twelve years old as reported in the outskirts of Baidoa, where a Ugandan soldier 
allegedly raped a twelve year girl (Human Rights Watch 2008). The Kenyan military forces have 
also been accused of human rights violation both at home – through violent actions against 
minority Somali communities – and abroad in Somalia where they have been accused of 
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colluding with Al-Shabaab in illegal charcoal and sugar trade that funds the terror group (The 
Telegraph 2015)  
 From the above reports; it is quite clear that acts of state repression that involve the 
abuse of human rights through the state’s armed forces are key causative factors of terrorism as 
shown in the regression reports Table (3) and (4)). With most of the funding and counter 
terrorism training coming from the United States, this study proposes the following to the global 
hegemon: providing conditions – human rights observance – while offering military aid to the 
governments of the region; and training the local militaries on strategies of winning the hearts 
and minds of the people in the region through human rights observance; and encouraging the 
promotion of democratic values in the region through the US Civil Affairs team.   
5.1.3 Member States   
The governments in the region should ensure their counter-terrorism laws are not 
discriminative, especially along tribal and religious lines. Coast-line and border surveillance 
should be strengthened through sharing of intelligence, as the region serves as the African 
bridge to the Middle East. In addition, the governments of the region must create economic 
opportunities for a growing youth population and promote democratic values, while ensuring 
that presidential term limits are obeyed. Lastly, they should support Somalia’s Government in 
its bid to stabilize the country. In doing this, the Horn of Africa will cease to be one of the 
epicenters of terrorism.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure 1: Horn of Africa Terrorism Risk  
  
Source: Author’s construction using data from the Institute for Economics and Peace Global 
Terrorism Index  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics, 2002-2013, Annual Data  
Variable Observ Mean      Std. Dev. Min Max 
Terr_risk 84 3.839524     2.364276 0 7.41 
Pol_ts 84 3.833333     .8335341 2 5 
Lnggdp_pc 84 5.996216     .6414478 4.679558 7.085043 
lnPopln 84 16.44988     1.484236 13.52176 18.36473 
Polity2 83 -.5662651     4.612266 -7 9 
 Gvt_eff 84 -1.038718 .5809922 -2.450037 -.3435738 
Pol_stab 84 -1.421987     .9070071 -3.323905 .5006028 
Voice_acc 84 -1.267712     .6493777 -2.233534 -.1375531 
lfp_youth 72 56.27917     17.28483 35.1 79.5 
R_law  84 -1.09272   .6160051 -2.668873 -.3359891 
  
Terr_risk = terrorism risk; Pol_ts = Political terror scale; Lngdp_pc = Log of GDP per capita; lnPopln = 
Log of Population; Polity2 = democratic score; gvt_effc=government effectiveness; Pol_stab= Political 
stability and lack of violence/terrorism; Voice_acc = Voice and accountability; lfp_youth = Youth Labor 
force participation; R_law = Rule of law   
Source: Authors calculations using Stata  
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Table 2: Pairwise Correlation  
Terr_risk = terrorism risk; Pol_ts = Political terror scale; Lngdp_pc = Log of GDP per capita; lnPopln = 
Log of Population; Polity2 = democratic score; gvt_effc=government effectiveness; Pol_stab= Political 
stability and lack of violence/terrorism; Voice_acc = Voice and accountability; lfp_youth = Youth Labor 
force participation; R_law = Rule of law   
Source: Authors calculations using Stata   
  
  
  
  
  
  
   voice_acc     0.0199   0.3044  -0.2247   0.2938   0.6458   0.3414   0.7666 
   lfp_youth    -0.6418  -0.6755  -0.5304  -0.1203  -0.5150   0.5483   0.2875 
       r_law    -0.3963   0.2361  -0.4373   0.1047  -0.0090   0.7498   0.9266 
    gvt_effc    -0.1944   0.2224  -0.3343   0.2924   0.1754   0.6003   1.0000 
    pol_stab    -0.7533   0.3275  -0.7057  -0.4646   0.0610   1.0000 
     polity2     0.0572   0.2981  -0.2044   0.0203   1.0000 
     lnpopln     0.6654  -0.3247   0.5682   1.0000 
      pol_ts     0.7645  -0.1706   1.0000 
    lngdp_pc    -0.1376   1.0000 
   terr_risk     1.0000 
                                                                             
               terr_r~k lngdp_pc   pol_ts  lnpopln  polity2 pol_stab gvt_effc
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Table 3: Political and Economic Determinants of Terrorism  
Dependent Variable: Terrorism Risk  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 fe1 fe2 fe3 fe4 fe5 fe6 
VARIABLES Terr_Risk Terr_Risk Terr_Risk Terr_Risk Terr_Risk Terr_Risk 
       
lngdp_pc -0.447 -0.748 -0.595 -0.922 -0.610 -0.339 
 (0.365) (0.574) (0.656) (0.790) (0.493) (0.577) 
pol_ts 0.945** 0.926** 0.737** 1.002** 0.709* 0.927** 
 (0.368) (0.350) (0.266) (0.339) (0.292) (0.292) 
lnpopln 5.266 6.034* 5.762* 7.007** 6.825*** 7.966* 
 (3.653) (2.779) (2.644) (2.170) (1.821) (3.871) 
polity2  -0.247 -0.157 -0.110 -0.0386 0.0689 
  (0.270) (0.292) (0.255) (0.207) (0.127) 
Pol_Stab   -1.110 -1.007 -0.652 -0.927 
   (0.920) (0.994) (0.770) (1.098) 
govt_effc    1.854* 3.502*** 4.098*** 
    (0.924) (0.535) (0.774) 
R_Law     -3.047** -2.288** 
     (1.030) (0.729) 
lfp_youth      0.255 
      (0.331) 
Voice_Acc      -2.153 
      (1.456) 
Constant -83.72 -94.62* -91.86* -109.3** -108.1** -149.0 
 (60.94) (47.67) (45.23) (37.80) (31.02) (78.19) 
       
Observations 84 84 84 84 84 72 
R-squared 0.292 0.343 0.392 0.429 0.523 0.654 
Number of country code 7 7 7 7 7 6 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Terr_risk = terrorism risk; Pol_ts = Political terror scale; Lngdp_pc = Log of GDP per capita; lnPopln  
= Log of Population; Polity2 = democratic score; gvt_effc=government effectiveness; Pol_stab=  
Political stability and lack of violence/terrorism; Voice_acc = Voice and accountability; lfp_youth = 
Youth Labor force participation; R_law = Rule of law  
Note: Djibouti is excluded from specification (6) due to lack of data on youth labor force participation    
Source: Authors calculations using Stata   
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Table 4: Political and Economic Determinants of Terrorism – One year Lag  
Dependent Variable: Terrorism Risk  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 fe1 fe2 fe3 fe4 fe5 fe6 
VARIABLES Terr_Risk Terr_Risk Terr_Risk Terr_Risk Terr_Risk Terr_Risk 
       
lnLaggdppc -0.556 -0.764 -0.696 -0.739 -0.265 -0.0584 
 (0.409) (0.642) (0.685) (0.756) (0.570) (0.263) 
pol_ts 1.075** 1.065** 0.866** 1.152** 0.884** 1.126*** 
 (0.419) (0.404) (0.342) (0.391) (0.286) (0.195) 
lnpopln 6.206 6.890* 6.836* 7.880** 7.606** 8.575** 
 (3.770) (3.037) (2.968) (2.554) (2.068) (3.207) 
polity2  -0.195 -0.117 -0.0753 0.00403 0.0766 
  (0.255) (0.267) (0.241) (0.198) (0.0923) 
Pol_Stab   -1.101 -0.881 -0.605 -0.853 
   (0.785) (0.815) (0.676) (0.818) 
govt_effc    2.073* 3.659*** 3.872*** 
    (0.891) (0.690) (0.886) 
R_Law     -3.241** -2.282** 
     (1.011) (0.849) 
lfp_youth      0.392 
      (0.257) 
Voice_Acc      -3.147* 
      (1.450) 
Constant -99.09 -109.2* -109.5* -125.0** -123.7** -170.9** 
 (63.34) (52.01) (50.60) (44.00) (35.20) (64.05) 
       
Observations 77 77 77 77 77 66 
R-squared 0.322 0.354 0.403 0.445 0.550 0.712 
Number of country code 7 7 7 7 7 6 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Terr_risk = terrorism risk; Pol_ts = Political terror scale; lnLaggdppc = Log of Lagged GDP 
per capita; lnPopln = Log of Population; Polity2 = democratic score; gvt_effc=government 
effectiveness; Pol_stab= Political stability and lack of violence/terrorism; Voice_acc = Voice 
and accountability; lfp_youth = Youth Labor force participation; R_law = Rule of law  
Note: Djibouti is excluded from specification (6) due to lack of data on youth labor force participation   
 Source: Authors calculations using Stata    
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